# Rotating Keys
Key rotation consists in retiring and replacing cryptographic keys with new ones.
Performing that operation on a regular basis is an industry standard.
## Why should I rotate my keys?
Rotating keys allows us to:
1. Limit the number of tokens signed with the same key, helping the prevention of attacks enabled by cryptanalysis
2. Adopt other algorithms or stronger keys
3. Limit the impact of eventual compromised keys
## The challenges
After rotating keys, apps will likely receive requests with tokens issues with the previous key.
If the key rotation of an app is done with a "hard cut", requests with non-expired tokens issued with the old key **will fail**!
Imagine if you were the user who logged in just before a key rotation on that kind of app, you'd probably have to log in again!
That's rather frustrating, right!?
## Preventing issues
It's possible to handle key rotation in a smoother way by leveraging the `SignedWithOneInSet` validation constraint!
Say your application uses the symmetric algorithm `HS256` with a not so secure key to issue tokens:
```php
issue(
new Signer\Hmac\Sha256(),
InMemory::plainText(
'a-very-long-and-secure-key-that-should-actually-be-something-else'
),
static fn (Builder $builder): Builder => $builder
->issuedBy('https://api.my-awesome-app.io')
->permittedFor('https://client-app.io')
);
```
!!! Sample
Here's a token issued with the code above, if you want to test the script locally:
Sample token
// line breaks added for readability
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9
.eyJpYXQiOjE2OTkxMzE5NjEsIm5iZiI6MTY5OTEzMTk2MSwiZXhwIjoxNjk5MTMyMjYxLCJpc3MiOiJ
odHRwczovL2FwaS5teS1hd2Vzb21lLWFwcC5pbyIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vY2xpZW50LWFwcC5pbyJ9
.IA9S0n8Q2O97lyR8KczVE8g-hxbbH6_TfJS-JWTQR4c
Your parsing logic (with validations) look like:
```php
parse($jwt, ...$validationConstraints);
```
### Performing a backwards compatible rotation
Now Imagine that you want to adopt the new `BLAKE2B` symmetric algorithm.
These are the changes to your issuing logic:
```diff
issue(
- new Signer\Hmac\Sha256(),
+ new Signer\Blake2b(),
- InMemory::plainText(
- 'a-very-long-and-secure-key-that-should-actually-be-something-else'
+ InMemory::base64Encoded(
+ 'GOu4rLyVCBxmxP+sbniU68ojAja5PkRdvv7vNvBCqDQ='
),
static fn (Builder $builder): Builder => $builder
->issuedBy('https://api.my-awesome-app.io')
->permittedFor('https://client-app.io')
);
```
!!! Sample
Here's a token issued with the code above, if you want to test the script locally:
Sample token
// line breaks added for readability
eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJCTEFLRTJCIn0
.eyJpYXQiOjE2OTkxMzE5NjEsIm5iZiI6MTY5OTEzMTk2MSwiZXhwIjoxNjk5MTMyMjYxLCJpc3Mi
OiJodHRwczovL2FwaS5teS1hd2Vzb21lLWFwcC5pbyIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vY2xpZW50LWFwc
C5pbyJ9.bD67s8IXpAJiBTIZn1et_M5WSS7kfmuNiacNRz5lArQ
So far, nothing different that a normal rotation.
Now check the changes on the parsing and validation logic:
```diff
parse($jwt, ...$validationConstraints);
```
Now the application is able to accept non-expired tokens issued with either old and new keys!
In this case, the old key would automatically only be accepted until `2023-12-31 23:59:59+00:00`, even if engineers forget to remove it from the list.
!!! Important
The order of `SignedWithUntilDate` constraints given to `SignedWithOneInSet` does matter, and it's recommended to leave older keys at the end of the list.